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7 February 2016 
The Road to Hell is Paved with Bad Public Pensions: An Analysis of Illinois’ Public Pension 
System 
Introduction 
The state of Illinois has been in the fiscal dumps for years now. With over $200 billion in 
debt, the state’s per capita debt exceeds $10,000. So what is driving Illinois’ debt? How did the 
state get to the fiscal position it is in? With several different programs qualifying as an answer, 
we must look at the biggest part of the debt and the least solvent part: Illinois’ public pension 
system. With roughly $130 billion in debt, the public pension system is crushing the state. Even 
if the state’s debt were reduced just to what is owed in public pensions, Illinois taxpayers would 
still be on the hook for roughly $10,000. In comparison to other states, Illinois has the worst 
pension system in the United States. Even while being armed with this information, politicians in 
Illinois have ignored pension reform and have continued to use patronage politics to hold the 
state’s fiscal health hostage by the pension system. So what are factors that have contributed to 
Illinois pension issues? What factors can contribute to an increasingly insolvent public pension 
system? What are the intersections between many of Illinois’ financial issues and the public 
pension system? This paper will seek to analyze the public pension system of Illinois in regards 
to an understanding of the system itself, the actors that have played significant legislative roles 
with the system, and the consequences of having a poor public pension system.  
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Why Does This Matter? 
The question of why someone would study the public pension system in Illinois is one 
that is incredibly relevant to a wide variety of people and it is very important to understand the 
fiscal health of Illinois. To start, public pension analysis is needed because Illinois has no choice 
but to fundamentally rethink the way it offers public pensions and it must ask the question of 
why pension issues have bubbled up. Governments need to always reevaluate entitlement 
programs and the effect they have on the fiscal health of a state. Second, Illinois’ public pension 
crisis has permeated into other areas of the economy and it has created an environment where 
drags on the economy have become interconnected with one another. Illinois has over $200 
billion dollars in debt, with $130 billion of that in public pensions. Illinois’ debt has created a 
downgrade of the state’s credit rating to a BBB, which is the lowest in the country (CNBC). 
Credit issues reflect directly on the state government’s ability to pay back its debts or pay 
properly for entitlement programs. Additionally, poor credit would make people want higher 
returning government bonds to offset the risk they undertake by purchasing a more risk bond. 
Population issues have also been a problem in Illinois. Illinois’s credit problem creates a strong 
incentive for people to leave the state, as faith and trust in government institutions falls and taxes 
rise to pay for insolvent government programs. This phenomenon can be seen in the recent 
budget proposal put forward by the Illinois State Senate, which would hike the state’s income tax 
by 1.2% (Dabrowski, Klingner). When people leave, tax revenues fall in the state, further 
compounding the fiscal issues Illinois faces. An insolvent public pension system puts one group 
of people on the hook for pensions: Illinois taxpayers. As taxes rise to pay for the increased 
insolvency of the public pension system, the cost of living in Illinois keeps rising and rising, 
further creating incentives for people to leave and created high income barriers to entry for the 
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state. This is especially tough for young people, who are towards the lower end of the income 
distribution and would have a harder time living in Illinois than someone who has been working 
for over twenty years. Figure 5 outlines the taxpayer contributions towards public pensions 
relevant to employee contributions.  
Literature Review 
Public pensions throughout the United States have become a hot topic for two groups of 
people: economists and legal scholars. Public pension debt has ballooned upward in recent years, 
leaving economists to wonder about actuarial calculations and leaving lawyers to examine the 
legal structures that have allowed so many state and local governments to ignore their pension 
promises. In her article entitled Funding Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical 
Analysis of Institutional Design, Natalya Shnitser states “even though all U.S. public pension 
plans can be characterized by political promises of future benefits and powerful incentives to 
shirk on current funding for such promises, institutions that facilitate transparency and pre-
commitment to actuarially determined funding policies may mitigate the shifting of current 
pension costs to future taxpayers” (Shnitser 666). Shnitser emphasizes the fact that politicians 
have often given generous pensions out as a political tool for their own advantage, but have left 
the real legal and mathematical work to future actors and have put the burden of paying for these 
pensions on taxpayers down the road. Shnitser also states, “In stark contrast to the 401 (k)-type 
defined contribution plans that are pervasive in the private sector, public sector defined benefit 
plans allocate the management and investment risk to the employers, thus making the employers 
liable for the promised amounts regardless of investment performance in any given period” 
(Shnitser 668). This key distinction between public sector pension plans and private sector 401k 
plans is a key fact in distinguishing the two plans. No matter what, the state is always on the 
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hook in a pension plan without even acknowledging that the state may never have the ability to 
cover the difference between the performance of the investment and the actual promised benefits. 
In Illinois, politicians have done this for decades now. By racking up $130 billion in public 
pension debt, the state has continued to kick the can down the road and failed to fundamentally 
rethink its pension system.  
Most research done on public pensions generally looks at how pensions are funded and 
the numbers behind them. Until the last couple of years, this research has done very little work in 
regards to an in depth analysis of public pension systems, especially in regards to the 
consequences that inadequacies in pension funding has done to the fiscal condition of several 
states. Morningstar, a research firm specializing in pension analysis, has become the gold 
standard in pension research in the last few years. In its report from 2013, Morningstar found that 
Illinois has only about forty percent of its pension obligations funded, which is the worst funding 
ratio in the country by far (Morningstar 2). When taking other states into consideration, 
Wisconsin, Texas, and California have funding ratios as follows: 99.9%, 82%, and 76% 
respectively (Morningstar 2). These funding ratios are incredibly important to analyze because 
they give great insight into the health of these respective public pension systems. Morningstar 
uses an eighty percent funding ratio as the cut-off for a healthy pension system, meaning that 
anything under eighty percent is unhealthy and anything over that is considered healthy.  
Unfortunately, very little research has been done that has delved into the consequences of 
a poorly operated public pension system. A lot of research has been publicized about the myriad 
of economic issues and phenomena that has occurred in Illinois, but not much has been done to 
attempt to analyze the intersection of the pension system to those issues. My paper will play a 
niche role in that because, without analyzing the connections, reform will cease to exist in 
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Illinois and the state’s politicians will continue to kick the can down the road for future 
generations to deal with.  
Let’s Learn About Illinois’ Public Pension System 
To say that Illinois’ public pension system is bad is quite an understatement. But for one 
to fully understand the issues the system faces, one must get a general overview of the system 
and how it operates. Illinois is home to 667 pension plans (Dabrowski & Klingner). These 
pension plans cover a litany of professions, ranging from first responders to educators. 5 of these 
plans cover K-12 and University educators, state employees, judges, and members of the Illinois 
General Assembly (Dabrowski & Klingner). 355 plans are for police officers, 296 plans are for 
firefighters, and one plan is for municipal workers (Dabrowski & Klingner). Finally, 7 plans 
encompass employees in Chicago and 3 are for employees in Cook County (Dabrowski & 
Klingner). By comparison, California has just 88 different plans, while Texas and Wisconsin 
have 142 and 4 respectively (Ballotopedia). It is unclear what the massive size of Illinois’ public 
pension system does to its funding. I would argue that this massive size creates a situation in 
which accountability is hard to maintain. As the system gets larger, I can foresee it being difficult 
to maintain continuity of funding among the plans. 
 Illinois’ pensions operate off of a defined benefit model. A defined benefit model creates 
a formula that outlines what a pension recipient will receive throughout the time of their pension 
(The Civic Federation 5). A defined benefit model also has one key characteristic: the 
employee’s employer will make up for the difference between the defined benefit and what the 
pension returned on its investment (The Civic Federation 5). This differs drastically from a 
defined contribution plan, where the employer and the employee make set contributions (The 
Civic Federation 6). The employee’s benefit from the plan is the value of the pension once the 
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employee chooses to retire (The Civic Federation 6). This is an incredibly important 
characteristic of Illinois’ pension plan, and a characteristic of most insolvent pension plans 
across the country. Illinois’ problem starts here, in that the state’s plans have not made enough 
money and the employer, which is the state, has been put on the hook to make up the difference 
in the defined benefit plans. Unfortunately, the state does not just have money lying around that 
it did not get from taxpayers. When these defined benefit pension plans do not generate enough 
money, residents of Illinois are forced to pay for them.  
Illinois has two tiers in its public pension system. Tier One pensions are older pensions, 
given to people who retired before 2011. These pensions make up a large majority of the pension 
system. In 2011, the Illinois General Assembly made an attempt to reform public pensions in the 
state by creating a second tier (The Civic Federation 10). This tier reduced some of the benefits 
that Tier One recipients receive with the idea in mind that Illinois had, historically, been over 
generous with its pension benefits. Still though, Tier Two pensions are not much better than Tier 
One pensions. In an article discussing the issues that Tier Two pensions face, Dick Ingram, 
Executive Director of the Teachers’ Retirement System pension program, explains that in 
addition to paying much more into their pension plans, Tier Two pension recipients also help 
subsidize the cost of Tier One pensions by having some of their income go directly towards 
paying for those plans (Ingram 1). Ingram, a Tier Two pension recipient himself, paints the Tier 
Two pension system as unjust in comparison to Tier One, mostly because of the fact that these 
employees wind up paying for the pensions that Tier One recipients receive (Ingram 1).  
So, let’s take a look at the actual numbers. According to John Klingner of Illinois Policy, 
Illinois has a total pension debt of $130 billion in 2016 (Klingner). To put this into perspective, if 
every household were to pay $27,000 at a one-time fee, the state could pay off its unfunded 
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pension liabilities (Klingner). Per capita pension debt in Illinois is roughly $10,150. The per 
capita figure would include all those who are not even in the labor force and would be unable to 
have disposable income. A more realistic and striking perspective for the debt would be to look 
at Illinois per capita pension debt in the labor force. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated 
that Illinois had a labor force size of 6,564,448 at the end of October of 2016 (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). Per capita pension debt for the labor force in Illinois would be roughly $19,800. 
Illinois’s public pension debt is astounding and for even greater perspective, I will imagine that 
this was a federal program. Taking the United States’ population and multiplying it by Illinois 
per capita debt ($10,150), the total debt of a program like this at the federal level would be 
roughly $3.24 trillion. I will concede that this is not the best or an entirely accurate way of 
gaining some perspective here seeing as different areas of the country have differing economies, 
which can alter funding for pensions, but it still gives an idea of how massive the pension 
obligations in Illinois are relative to its population.  
More striking about Illinois’ pension issues is how quickly this problem has gotten 
completely out of hand. As Figure 1 shows, Illinois unfunded pension obligations have more 
than doubled since 2008 (Klingner). In that time frame, Illinois unfunded pension obligations 
have increased by an average amount of roughly $9 billion per year. Arguably the worst 
realization about this is that Illinois had seen a reduction in its pension obligations from 2003 to 
2004, just 5 years before 2008.  
What is it about Illinois’ public pension plans that are so insolvent? How did the state 
rack up this much in debt and what about the plans makes them so incredibly hard to fund? First 
and foremost, the plans are inherently flawed from the beginning. By this, I mean that the plans 
have defined benefits that are far too generous for the state to be able to pay. This is clearly seen 
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by examining the incentive structure for retirement for workers with public pensions and the 
percent that these workers contribute to their plans, relative to what they are estimated to receive. 
According to Ted Dabrowski and John Klingner of Illinois Policy, “sixty percent of state 
workers retire in their 50s” (Dabrowski & Klingner). Before a worker has even collected a dollar 
in their pension, a math problem already exists. As people begin living longer, these state 
workers can expect to receive a pension for longer amounts of time, draining resources from the 
state and making the plans more and more costly. In the private sector, most workers retire in 
their sixties, allowing for there to be less pressure on federal programs like Social Security, and 
allowing these workers to contribute more to more solvent retirement options, such as a 401(k). 
Looking at incentives, one should wonder why a public sector employee in Illinois would want 
to retire around the same time most private sector employees do. There is no incentive for public 
sector workers to do so simply because they are offered a scenario where the utility these 
workers receive from retiring outweighs the utility they receive from working. This is potentially 
due to the fact that Illinois workers can receive full benefits and a generous pension in their 50s, 
and then draw on Social Security in their 60s, creating more of a safety net for them. Illinois 
pension plans also have an automatic three percent cost of living adjustment (COLA), placed 
annually in pension benefits (Dabrowski & Klingner). This COLA creates issues in years where 
the COLA would be higher than average cost of living adjustments, citing yet another math 
problem. One of the biggest drivers of Illinois’ cost of living issues are its property taxes, which 
have been hiked on taxpayers to help pay for insolvent government programs. It is almost 
comedic that Illinois has implemented a COLA in its pension plans, which, in my opinion, are 
contributing to ever increasing property taxes. It also seems striking that Illinois’ pension plans 
would have such a COLA because Social Security does the same thing. Nothing is inhibiting 
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these workers from drawing on Social Security, so these workers can essentially double dip the 
system and receive even larger benefits. Perhaps the largest reason that Illinois has such an 
insolvent public pension system is that employees contribute very little to their pensions, while 
the employer, the State of Illinois, has to contribute most of the benefits through taxpayer dollars. 
Dabrowski and Klingner state, “Most retirees contribute 4 to 8 percent (8 to 16 percent when 
interest earned on investments is included) of what they receive in retirement benefits.” 
(Dabrowski & Klingner). For example, a retiree in the State Universities Retirement System 
contributed $112,102 to their pension and are estimated to receive just over $3,013,865 
(Dabrowski & Klingner). Figure 2 provides a chart of retirees and what their contributions to 
estimated payouts are.  
Analysis: Actors and Influence- Patronage Politics or Public Good? 
 There are significant actors within the public pension system. First off, political 
leadership plays a role, regardless of whether or not they have directly contributed to the issue. In 
the House of Representatives, the main actor would be Speaker Michael Madigan. Madigan, who 
has been Speaker of the House for every year except two since 1983, has presided over the 
racking up of Illinois’ public pension debt. Interestingly enough, Madigan has accepted over $1.1 
million from public sector unions from 2002 until 2014 (Giuliani). This money came from the 
state’s five largest government unions (Guiliani). In the State Senate, little changes. Senate 
President John Cullerton has taken $556,450 from the largest 5 unions (Guiliani). In regards to 
the General Assembly as a whole, eighty-six percent of the General Assembly took donations 
from government unions from 2002 to 2014 (Giuliani). Figure 4 shows a chart of all members of 
the General Assembly who did not take money from the state’s five largest public sector unions 
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between 2002 and 2014, while Figure 6 shows the ten largest recipients of money from those 
same five unions.  
 In terms of Illinois’ executive branch, several governors have played some sort of a 
substantial role on how the state has dealt with pensions. Former Republican Governor Jim 
Edgar played a major role with really beginning to “kick the can down the road”. Governor 
Edgar signed legislation in the early 1990s that pushed pension obligations back fifty years. 
Essentially, this legislation allowed lawmakers to ignore funding the pension system properly for 
decades. Dubbed the “Edgar Ramp” by some, the 1994 bill did nothing about reforming the 
pension system and how its benefits are determined, but altered the structures of when payments 
to state employees would occur (Dabrowski). Since Edgar, Illinois governors have mostly done 
one thing in order to handle pension obligations: borrow money. Governor Rod Blagojevich 
borrowed $10 billion (Dabrowski). Governor Pat Quinn borrowed $7.2 billion for pension 
payments and followed up the borrowing with a large income tax hike (Dabrowski).  
 What is clear is that these actors have one thing in common and that is a real lack of 
desire to do anything truly meaningful about the public pension system. In fact, my belief is that 
many actors, especially members of the General Assembly, have more invested in patronage 
politics that they do about doing what is necessary for the fiscal health of Illinois. By this, I mean 
that some politicians, especially rather powerful ones, have more to win by cozying up to large 
unions, as seen by their donations, than they do to fix the structure of the pension system, which 
is something that would directly impact the people that these unions represent. I will go into 
larger analysis of this later in my paper as I draw the connection between political corruption, but 
this notion of patronage politics is worth mentioning here.  
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Consequences of Ignorance 
 Illinois’ public pension system has created humongous financial issues across many areas 
of the economy. Illinois has several economic issues mostly centered in migration, budgetary 
issues, and political corruption. I would contest that most of these issues are either driven by the 
public pension issues in the state, or have very strong connections to the public pension system. 
Illinois’ migration issues are mostly centered around the fact that Illinois is experiencing an 
exodus of people. A recent report put out by Illinois Policy’s Michael Lucci details Illinois’ 
massive migration issues, especially in comparison to other states. On average, Illinois loses one 
resident every 5 minutes (Lucci). That means that Illinois loses, on average, 288 people per day, 
which would then equate to 105,120 people in one year. Using the population from the United 
States Census Bureau, this means that Illinois could lose the just short of the entire population of 
the state’s capitol, Springfield, in just one year (United States Census Bureau). Over the last 
decade, this pace has been slower, with Illinois losing just over 300,000 in the past ten years 
(Lucci). Looking at these numbers, it is clear that most of Illinois’ migration issues have been far 
more recent and that they pace of out migration has ramped up rapidly over the past couple of 
years. Figure 3 shows Midwest outmigration statistics.  
Why is this occurring in Illinois? First off, Illinois has become an expensive place to live. 
With the highest property taxes in the country, Illinois has made it hard on their own residents to 
thrive in the state. I attribute most of the property tax hikes to the public pension system. As 
pension obligations grow and grow, politicians find it generally easier to hike property taxes than 
other tax forms in order to pay for public pensions. The ironic part about the migration issue in 
Illinois is that the reactions from politicians will continue to make the public pension system 
worse. As more and more people leave Illinois, tax revenue in the state will fall. As this falls, 
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politicians are apt to hike taxes to cover the difference, but this will likely lead to more people 
leaving Illinois and creating a vicious cycle. Second, I would attribute my next two points, 
budgetary issues and political corruption, as two central reasons that would also drive people out 
of the state. These will be elaborated on in coming paragraphs, but it is worth analyzing people’s 
incentives in Illinois in regards to these two topics. Why would people want to live in a state that 
rarely even passes a budget, let alone a balanced one? Why would people want to live in a state 
where construction projects halt at budget impasses, where taxes are generally high, and where 
general financial incompetence seems to rain supreme in the government? Many Illinoisans 
could much more easily live in other states and receive much similar incomes and not deal with 
high property taxes and such governmental dysfunction. Combine this with the history of 
political corruption that Illinois has, it is clear to understand why many people would want to 
leave Illinois.  
 As I mentioned above, another major issue has been a budget. Illinois has a history of not 
even passing a budget. The most recent “budget” was not even a complete twelve-month budget, 
but rather a stop gap bill that funded what they General Assembly found to be the most 
important. Most of the provisions of that bill expired on December 31 of 2016, so the state is 
back at it again with no budget. This, though, is not something strange to residents of the state. 
Illinois has not even passed a balanced budget since 2001 (Rasmussen). Since 1970, Illinois has 
only had a balanced budget fifteen times (Rasmussen). Perhaps the worst part about this reality is 
that Illinois is constitutionally mandated to have a balanced budget. So, how does this tie in to 
public pension obligations? First off, public pension obligations are being paid by the state, so 
these are something that need to be covered in a budget. By not passing a budget, Illinois is 
going to have two options. One option is that things simply will not be paid, or the courts can 
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force the state to pay. Neither option is good and it has been the second option that has occurred. 
Currently, the state has several court decrees that force certain payments to be made. These court 
decrees have put the state in somewhat of a peculiar situation, as most people would think that 
the state would not spend as much as thought of because of this. Surprisingly, Illinois is actually 
set to spend a record amount of money in Fiscal Year 2017, of almost $40 billion (Berg). Almost 
$10 billion of that is tied up in public pension payments (Berg). Regardless of a budget, it 
appears that Illinois will continue to spend incredible amounts of money and refuse to reform its 
ever increasing pension obligations. 
 Finally, Illinois’ history of political corruption has a strong mark on Illinois’s public 
pension system. Six Illinois governors have been arrested or indicted on a crime (Suddath). 
Recent governors George Ryan and Rod Blagojevich are two of these examples. Chicago has a 
long history of corruption, with almost too many examples to count. The current Speaker of 
House, Michael Madigan, has been repeatedly tied to corruption throughout his career. What 
does this corruption have to do with public pensions? First off, I find it hard to believe that 
Illinois’ politicians can handle a massive pension program when they cannot even be trusted to 
do their jobs honestly and legally. Illinoisans have a real skepticism of politicians and it is clear 
to see why. Second, this political corruption is a sign that politicians are willing to do things that 
would not make sense, such as racking up as much pension debt as the state has. When analyzing 
incentives, one would not find that it would be in the best interests of politicians to do things that 
would create a lack of trust in the government. A lack of trust would make most people believe 
that Illinois’ voters would not re-elect politicians if they are doing their jobs poorly. This, 
though, leads to my third point that some politicians in Illinois, especially some more powerful 
ones, stand to profit off of the state’s issues. As pointed out in his article about politicians 
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profiting from property tax hikes, Austin Berg points out that both House Speaker Michael 
Madigan and Senate President John Cullerton are members of law firms that specialize in 
property tax appeals (Berg). The more property taxes rise, the more these politicians can make 
by saving their clients’ money on their property taxes. One way to hike property taxes is to have 
some sort of unsustainable program, like public pensions. This profit motive might help explain 
why there has been a real lack of reform with the public pension system, as well as a real lack of 
a willingness to reform it by many career politicians. It is not possible to definitively point to this 
and say that it is the main reason for reform, nor am I willing to make that accusation. These ties, 
though, are important to mention and they are important in the understanding of where Illinois 
has stood from a reform standpoint. 
What Can Be Done? 
 Throughout my paper, I have laid out quite a bleak image of Illinois’ public pension 
system. I concede that I have made the system seem entirely broken and hopeless. The system is 
very broken, but it is not one that I think is entirely hopeless. If people want to sit on their hands 
and avoid confronting these issues, then Illinois will suffer and the state will never reach the 
levels of economic prosperity that the state should be at. There are several options that Illinois 
policy makers can do to fix the system, or to help alleviate issues that the public pension crisis 
will create and or exacerbate. Let’s start with how to fix the system flaws. As I have laid out 
above, Illinois has a defined benefit pension system. The problem with this system is that the 
state winds up having to make up the difference between the value of the pension investment and 
the defined amount an employee will receive. The most practical solution here, in my opinion, is 
to move all new public pensions into defined contribution, 401(k) style plans. This eliminates the 
gap that the state must dish out if the investment does not reach the amounts that an employee 
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has been guaranteed. At the time of retirement, a state employee would receive only the value of 
the fund. Furthermore, I would propose that the pensions be run not by the state, but run by 
employees themselves. I believe that this is the best option because it shifts choice and risk onto 
the employee and it takes away any possible legal trouble that the state could conceivably find 
itself in. By making the employee in charge of their own 401(k), the state is not responsible for 
the value of the pension at the employee’s retirement. Though it may be difficult from a legal 
standpoint, the state removes any liability it could have towards the pension plan, thus preventing 
any legal consequences. With this plan, a state employee has two major advantages. One is that 
they are in charge of their own retirement. They could hire an outside source to manage their 
money, as well. It allows them the freedom and autonomy to make their own financial decisions. 
Because the employee is not guaranteed a fixed income at retirement, this forces state employees 
to live within their means financially, and reduces any incentive that they may have for risky 
financial decisions. The second advantage is that it creates a major incentive for state employees 
to become more money and market conscious. Financial literacy is key in our country, and by 
making employees in charge of their own retirement, this can force employees to understand 
markets and how to properly make financial decisions. I will concede though, that having 
employees directly in charge of their retirement is a risky move. Reality tells us that a true 
understanding of our financial system and how to invest your own money is something not 
known by many people. This puts a bit of a limitation on some parts of this option for reform, 
but those choices would ultimately need to be made by policy makers.  
 In regards to removing the defined benefit plan for new state employees, this is a very 
broad reform measure. The reality is that there are a lot of ways in which this could be done. It 
ranges from proposals in the Illinois State Senate that would limit this reform to only five percent 
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of new state employees to ideas that would place all new state employees into 401(K) plans. 
With this idea, there is not one single plan about how to do it and there is not a consensus around 
how far to do it. Also, there remains a large legal question that would need to be answered. There 
exists some possibility that this may not even be constitutional by the State Constitution, but that 
would need to be addressed through legal means before any major substantive reform would take 
place.  
 Unfortunately, moving to a 401(k) plan only fixes the system for new state employees. 
This plan would do nothing about the fact that most of the pension debt in the state is tied up in 
the pensions owed to Tier 1 pensioners who retired previously to 2011. Reforming these plans 
could come in a few ways, but these are plans that would be hard to accomplish, nor would all of 
them be constitutional in Illinois. The first plan would be to cut the pension payouts to retirees by 
reforming the Illinois Constitution. This plan would save the state billions of dollars, but it is 
potentially unconstitutional by the Illinois State Constitution. Article 8, Section 5 of the Illinois 
Constitution states, “Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of 
local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an 
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” 
(State of Illinois). State officials could make a move to amend this part of the constitution, but it 
is highly unlikely and could potentially be political suicide for some people. Illinois has a 
process for this, but it was tried 2 years ago and wound up being unsuccessful. Personally, this is 
a plan that I am very much in support of, but it is one that is very unlikely. I believe this mostly 
because I believe that most people are not familiar enough with how bad of a condition the state 
is in. Voters would ultimately vote on this measure and I feel that it would not generate enough 
attention, unless voters come to the realization that they must pick between a total overhaul of 
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the pension system or crushing tax hikes. The power of Illinois’ unions I think would make this 
such a nasty political fight, excluding the power that the courts could even have on a proposal 
like this. If this plan were to ever come to light, I would support a measure that would get an 
estimate of what many retirees are likely to receive in their pensions. From there, I would 
advocate that lawmakers dish out a percentage of that estimation to retirees in either a one-time 
fashion, or over the span of a few years. Retirees would receive less than they were anticipating 
to receive, but they will have the option to re-invest some of that money and potentially make up 
some of the difference. This payment may make Illinois go through some time of financial 
hardship depending on how much would have to be given to retirees, but it would be better than 
the alternative of doing nothing about the existing payments that will have to be given out to 
retirees. 
 The final option that the state could do is to continue on with the status quo. The state can 
continue to disregard its pension crisis and wait until the bubble bursts. A debt bubble like this 
would likely put Illinois in some sort of Apocalypse-like financial situation. It is hard to pinpoint 
exactly what would trigger the bubble to burst or exactly when it could happen, but it is an 
inevitable thing if Illinois stays on the path it is on. In order to pay for these pension obligations, 
the state would likely need incredible tax hikes, which is likely to drive a mass of people out of 
the state before these were to set in place. Illinois would likely see a huge resource crisis, as 
almost all of the state’s resources would have to be put towards pensions. I admit that this is an 
event that is hard to speculate on. Many people would say that Illinois would never hit this kind 
of point, but Illinois has gotten to this point with little done to prevent it. Looking at the lack of 
political will to handle legitimate pension reform and the legal hurdles that would go into 
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overhauling the pension system, I think it is fair to assess that Illinois could reach a point of no 
return and fly off the fiscal cliff.  
 Overall, I am of the belief that the state needs to do two things, jointly, to save itself from 
complete and utter fiscal implosion. The first is to shift its new employees into 401(K) plans. 
This would remove the issues stemming from the defined benefit plan and reduce the stress 
placed on taxpayers, likely keeping them from leaving the state and create an avenue for property 
taxes to fall in the state.  Without removing the defined benefit system, I think that Illinois will 
always suffer from politicians using pensions as a political tool, allowing them to dish out nice 
benefits and suffer no consequences from it. Removing this allows for individuals to be in charge 
of their retirement and prevents taxpayers from paying for people to retire. The second change 
that I would advocate for is to amend the constitution that would remove Article 8, Section 5’s 
wording and replace it with something that recognizes the new pension system and allows for the 
state to change existing benefits. I do not have specific wording to solve this legal problem, but 
that is because I am not an attorney. Both of these issues would clear up Illinois’ largest debt 
issue and work to get Illinois to a place of prosperity instead of the dry rot it has been in.  
Limitations and Acknowledgements 
 Fortunately, I feel that I do not have a large amount of serious limitations for my project. 
I have been blessed to have a plethora of information to work with and I have been fortunate 
enough to have real time updates for my paper as the political battle for a budget in Illinois has 
gone on. Still though, I have a few limitations that I would like to discuss. A major one would be 
the numbers and actuarial side of public pensions. The amount that someone can be owed can 
vary with several factors including but not limited to retirement age, time in the workforce, and 
their employment sector. I will be honest with all of my readers by saying that the total amount 
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of pension obligations that Illinois would be owed can be a bit of a murky number. If a mass 
amount of public sector employees were to retire before they were projected to, this could have 
some significant repercussions in terms of total obligations owed by the state. The same could be 
said in a scenario where employees were to retire, in mass, at a date past when they were 
anticipated to retire. Even with this potential reality though, I think the pension obligations could 
realistically only be worse than projections and are more likely to paint a worse picture for 
Illinois than a better one. Another limitation would be some of my political factors, particularly 
in regards to the few politicians I discuss in detail. I would like to do a more-full scale analysis of 
their voting records on public policy related to pensions, but that would likely be a separate 
project in itself. That is the type of work that is of immense importance to this topic, but one that 
would stray away from the goals of my paper. I am intending this paper to be a public policy 
analysis and a paper designed to inform the public that the public pension system is one that they 
are liable for. If anyone would like to elaborate on my paper or criticize it, I recommend 
examining the voting records of prominent Illinois politicians. My last limitation would be to do 
a larger examination of the funding formula system for the public pension system. I have a hard 
time doing this mostly because the pension system in Illinois is so massive. There are so many 
pension administrators for different professions that I simply do not have the time to gather all 
the information in terms of understanding every little factor that goes into determining what 
someone will receive upon retirement. Again, this is recommended research I would have for 
someone if they wanted to elaborate or criticize my paper.  
 I have several acknowledgements for my paper. First, I would like to thank Illinois Policy 
for the work that they have done. I cite a lot of their research throughout my paper. My goal for 
the paper was to draw the connections between the financial issues that Illinois has to the public 
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pension system. I must thank them for the great work they have done on the litany of financial 
issues that Illinois faces and I only hope that I adequately drew the lines from those issues to the 
public pension system. Additionally, I would like to thank all of the authors for the rest of my 
sources for all the work that they have done trying to advocate for better public policy in Illinois. 
Next, I would like to extend my deepest appreciations to Dr. Mariano Magalhaes for being my 
advisor on this project. Thank you for pushing me as hard as you have and thank you for all of 
the feedback you have given me throughout the process of crafting this paper. In addition to Dr. 
Magalhaes, I would like to thank my classmates in my Senior Inquiry class for all the feedback 
they have given me. I appreciate all of the feedback and have tried my hardest to incorporate all 
of it into my paper. Finally, I would like to thank my brothers in the Delta Omega Nu fraternity 
for attending my presentation and being willing to listen to me when I get on my public policy 
soapbox. You all push me to be better at everything that I do and I cannot thank you all enough 
for that.  
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